From Root Causes to the Unconscious Dimension of Engineering Judgment
Modern marine and coastal infrastructure operates within some of the most demanding environments on Earth. Offshore platforms, artificial islands, breakwaters, quay walls, pipelines, and marine terminals must withstand an intricate combination of environmental loading, geotechnical uncertainty, operational demands, and long-term material degradation.
In regions such as the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea, these challenges are intensified by:
-
Extremely high salinity and temperature, accelerating corrosion processes
-
Shallow shelf morphodynamics, affecting wave transformation and sediment transport
-
Soft marine soils and carbonate sediments, influencing foundation performance
-
Rapid mega-project development, compressing design and construction schedules
Within such environments, understanding not only how systems perform but how and why they fail becomes a central engineering responsibility.
Failures may arise from structural deficiencies, geotechnical instability, hydraulic misjudgment, material degradation, operational mismanagement, or a combination of these factors. Regardless of discipline or scale, every failure demands a systematic and disciplined investigation aimed at identifying its true root causes.
Failure Cause Characterization in Marine Systems
Failure triggers in complex engineering systems can generally be categorized into three fundamental domains, collectively referred to as Failure Cause Characterization (Márquez, 2007):
Human Causes
Errors of omission or commission originating from human actions or decisions.
Examples in marine infrastructure include:
-
Misinterpretation of metocean data
-
Incorrect application of wave transformation models
-
Improper construction sequencing in reclamation works
-
Inadequate inspection regimes for offshore structures
These human errors often manifest later as physical failures.
Physical Causes
The direct technical mechanisms that produce failure.
Typical examples in marine-coastal engineering include:
-
Scour development around piles or monopiles
-
Hydraulic instability of breakwater armour layers
-
Foundation settlement in carbonate soils
-
Fatigue cracking in offshore structural members
-
Liquefaction under cyclic wave loading
-
Progressive corrosion of steel components in high-salinity waters
Physical causes represent the observable mechanisms, but they rarely explain the entire failure chain.
Latent Causes
Deficiencies embedded within management systems, governance structures, or organizational practices that allow failures to emerge.
Examples frequently observed in large Gulf projects include:
-
Over-reliance on global datasets (e.g., ERA5) without local calibration
-
Insufficient site investigation density in reclaimed island developments
-
Design schedules driven by commercial pressures rather than technical validation
-
Fragmented coordination between hydrodynamic, geotechnical, and structural teams
Latent causes are particularly dangerous because they exist upstream of observable failures and often remain hidden until a major incident occurs.
The Asset Management Perspective
Failure analysis is inseparable from asset management. Within the ISO 55000 asset management framework, performance evaluation must address not only outcomes but also the decision processes that produced them.
ISO guidance emphasizes that asset performance should be assessed by asking:
Have the asset management objectives been achieved?
If not, why not?
This question directly invokes the investigation of latent causes and decision-making adequacy.
For marine infrastructure—where assets may operate for 30–50 years under aggressive environmental conditions—Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA) becomes an essential component of lifecycle management.
Comparable principles are embedded within quality management systems such as ISO 9001, which require structured reporting, investigation procedures, and continuous improvement mechanisms.
Failure Investigation in Marine Infrastructure
A rigorous failure investigation typically requires the following minimum components:
Investigation Team Definition
A multidisciplinary team including:
-
Structural engineers
-
Geotechnical specialists
-
Coastal and hydraulic engineers
-
Materials scientists
-
Operations personnel
-
Independent technical reviewers
Data Collection
Systematic documentation of the incident:
-
Date and time of failure
-
Operational conditions (wave, tide, current)
-
Structural loading conditions
-
GIS and location data
-
Inspection history
Impact Evaluation
Assessment of:
-
Structural damage
-
Operational disruption
-
Environmental consequences
-
Economic losses
Technical Description of the Asset
This includes:
-
Structural configuration
-
Foundation type
-
Materials used
-
Design assumptions and codes applied
Root Cause Identification
Identification of both direct and systemic causes.
Corrective and Preventive Recommendations
Actions addressing both:
-
Immediate technical issues
-
Long-term systemic improvements
Supporting Evidence
Including:
-
Photographs and inspection reports
-
Monitoring data
-
Construction records
-
Numerical model results
Lessons Learned
Formal documentation for integration into future design and operational procedures.
Root Cause Analysis and Validation
Modern engineering practice relies on standardized RCA frameworks such as BS EN 62740, which provide structured methodologies for identifying and validating root causes.
The most critical phase of this process is validation.
Validation ensures that the identified cause truly explains the failure mechanism and can guide corrective action.
Common validation approaches include:
Independent Technical Review
External experts assess the investigation to eliminate bias and confirm methodological rigor.
Experimental or Physical Testing
Hydraulic models, structural testing, or laboratory experiments reproduce the failure mechanism under controlled conditions.
For example:
-
Breakwater stability verification in physical wave flumes
-
Soil strength characterization through laboratory geotechnical testing
Numerical Simulation
Advanced simulations may include:
-
Finite element modeling of structural behavior
-
Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of hydraulic conditions
-
Monte Carlo simulations of reliability and probabilistic loading
However, simulation models must be used cautiously. If the model assumptions do not realistically represent the physical system, the conclusions may become misleading.
The Limits of Engineering Knowledge
Despite the sophistication of modern analytical tools, all investigations operate within the limits of human knowledge.
A useful conceptual framework divides knowledge into four categories:
Known Knowns
Established facts, validated theories, and verified observations.
Examples include:
-
Wave mechanics theory
-
Structural mechanics principles
-
Verified soil properties
Known Unknowns
Recognized uncertainties such as:
-
Parameter variability in soil models
-
Measurement errors in wave data
-
Modeling assumptions
These uncertainties can often be managed through safety factors and probabilistic design methods.
Unknown Unknowns
Completely unforeseen factors such as:
-
undocumented seabed anomalies
-
unexpected construction deviations
-
undocumented third-party interventions
These events often appear only after failure has occurred.
Unknown Knowns
A concept explored by philosopher Slavoj Žižek, referring to knowledge that exists within the unconscious.
These are insights accumulated through years of experience, pattern recognition, and professional exposure.
In engineering practice, this is often described as expert intuition.
The Unconscious Dimension of Engineering Judgment
Engineering decisions are not purely analytical. Beyond explicit calculations and models, expert judgment frequently relies on internalized knowledge structures formed through experience.
An experienced marine engineer may detect inconsistencies in a design report or modeling result before being able to formally articulate the reason.
What appears to be intuition is often a rapid synthesis of accumulated technical knowledge.
Maintaining a well-informed unconscious therefore becomes an intellectual responsibility. It is developed through:
-
Continuous reading and study
-
Field observations and inspections
-
Exposure to real failure cases
-
Interaction with multidisciplinary experts
Many significant engineering insights emerge not during formal analysis but during moments of reflection—when the mind processes information beyond conscious attention.
Conclusion
In marine and coastal engineering, failures rarely originate from a single cause. They emerge from a complex interaction of technical mechanisms, human decisions, and organizational structures.
Effective failure analysis therefore requires more than technical calculation. It demands:
-
systematic investigation
-
multidisciplinary collaboration
-
rigorous validation methods
-
and the cultivated intuition of experienced engineers
In this sense, engineering judgment operates at the intersection of science, experience, and reflection.
Intuition is not the opposite of rigor.
It is its long-term byproduct.
References
Márquez, A. C. (2007). The Maintenance Management Framework: Models and Methods for Complex Systems Maintenance. Springer.
ISO (2014). ISO 55000: Asset Management — Overview, Principles and Terminology. International Organization for Standardization.
BSI (2015). BS EN 62740: Root Cause Analysis (RCA). British Standards Institution.
PIANC (2014). Harbour Approach Channels Design Guidelines. PIANC.
BSI (2018). BS 6349 Series: Maritime Works. British Standards Institution.
DNV (2021). DNV-ST-N001: Marine Operations and Marine Warranty. Det Norske Veritas.
ISO (2019). ISO 19901-1: Metocean Design and Operating Considerations. International Organization for Standardization.
Žižek, S. (2012). Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. Verso.
